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Background. There are few theoretical proposals that attempt to account for the variation in aﬀective processing
across diﬀerent aﬀective states of bipolar disorder (BD). The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) framework has
been recently extended to account for manic states. Within the framework, positive mood state is hypothesized to tap
into an implicational level of processing, which is proposed to be more extreme in states of mania.
Method. Thirty individuals with BD and 30 individuals with no history of aﬀective disorder were tested in euthymic
mood state and then in induced positive mood state using the Question–Answer task to examine the mode of
processing of schemas. The task was designed to test whether individuals would detect discrepancies within the
prevailing schemas of the sentences.
Results. Although the present study did not support the hypothesis that the groups diﬀer in their ability to detect
discrepancies within schemas, we did ﬁnd that the BD group was signiﬁcantly more likely than the control group to
answer questions that were consistent with the prevailing schemas, both before and after mood induction.
Conclusions. These results may reﬂect a general cognitive bias, that individuals with BD have a tendency to operate
at a more abstract level of representation. This may leave an individual prone to aﬀective disturbance, although
further research is required to replicate this ﬁnding.
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Introduction
Individuals with bipolar disorder (BD) cycle through
episodes of mania, depression and euthymia, demon-
strating dramatic ﬂuctuations in energy, social behav-
iour, mood and cognitive functioning. However, few
theoretical proposals have attempted to account for
the variation in aﬀective processing across depressed,
euthymic and manic states. Cognitive models based
on Beck’s model of aﬀective disorder (Beck, 1976,
1983) have been proposed that attempt to take account
of the complex interaction of biological, psychological
and social elements that characterize BD. However,
diﬃculties with what may be termed ‘single level
theories of emotion’ have been described both clini-
cally and conceptually (e.g. Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
To answer concerns about the limitations of such
models, multi-level theories have been devised to
provide a framework through which to formulate the
relationship between cognition and emotion.
The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS; Teas-
dale & Barnard, 1993) is an example of a multi-level
theory that was initially developed to account for
cognitive processing identiﬁed in individuals with
depression. Unlike in models of cognitive therapy, the
emphasis in this model is on the mode of processing
rather than the content of the structures. In brief,
the ICS provides a framework that addresses all as-
pects of information processing by deﬁning a complete
cognitive system composed of nine diﬀerent sub-
systems. Two of the levels considered central to many
activities, including the maintenance and moderation
of emotional states, are the implicational and prop-
ositional levels. It is hypothesized that speciﬁc mean-
ings are represented in patterns of propositional code.
Meanings at this level are explicit, correspond to the
kind of meaning conveyed by a single sentence, and
are not diﬃcult to grasp. By contrast, patterns of
implicational code represent higher order implicit
meanings, or schematic mental models, of experience.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEThe meaning from these models cannot be easily
conveyed, and the knowledge is implicit, rather than
explicit. Within the ICS, higher order implicational
meanings are the only level of representation that can
directly produce emotion. It follows that modiﬁcation
of emotional response, as in emotional processing,
necessarily involves changes in aﬀect-related sche-
matic models. Teasdale & Barnard (1993) proposed
that implicational representations are generic sche-
matic models that integrate the products of processing
propositional meaning withthe immediateproducts of
processing sensory information, including activated or
lowered body states. Thus, in depressed states it is
suggested that the processing of propositions more
or less continually regenerates negative self-models
encoded as generic, implicational meanings. These, in
turn, regenerate further negative propositions about
the self in cycles that are reinforced by inputs to the
schematic models from lowered bodily states. These
exchanges become interlocked in a negative feedback
loop.
Palmer & Barnard (2003) suggest that the mode of
processing may be entirely diﬀerent in mania to that
observed in depression. In depression, the idea that
negative schematic models of self are continually re-
generated implies a low rate of change in the content of
theimplicational image,hencemostattentionispaidto
moment-to-moment changes in the contents of the
propositional image. It is a mode linked to ruminative
thought, and less attention consequently assigned to
processing inter-relationships between schematic
models (Teasdale, 1999). By contrast, the manic state
is hypothesized to be associated with high rates of
change in the contents of the implicational image and
the schematic models represented in it. Therefore,
correspondingly less attention is paid to evaluating
inter-relationships between speciﬁc propositions, and
discrepancies may not be explicitly evaluated.
Using the Question–Answer task, Palmer &
Barnard (2003) tested the speciﬁc hypothesis that the
modes adopted when processing meaning might dif-
fer in depression and mania in a manner that can be
directly linked to symptomatology. In normal cog-
nition, there are circumstances where discrepant
meanings remain unevaluated. The authors give the
example that, when asked the question ‘How many
animals of each kind did Moses take into the ark?’
people frequently answer ‘two’, not noticing that the
biblical story referred to Noah, not Moses. This task
works because Moses ﬁts the same generic schema as
Noah, and so the diﬀerence between them is over-
looked. Using this phenomenon, the authors devised a
task that allowed them a means of testing the relative
amount of attention being devoted to referentially
speciﬁc as opposed to schematic meanings.
The task devised by Palmer & Barnard (2003) asked
individuals in manic and depressed states to answer
questions about the content of simple statements. Test
questions referenced a plausible inference based on
natural schemas for everyday events and were de-
signed to assess the extent to which discrepant mean-
ings were being actively scrutinized. For example, the
statement ‘Graham knew that Sue had brought
the ﬂowers in from the garden’ is compatible with
a schema-based inference that Sue had picked the
ﬂowers. When asked the question ‘Did Sue pick the
ﬂowers?’, it is hypothesized that the attention of in-
dividuals in a depressive state is likely to be focused
on the discrepancy between the two referentially spe-
ciﬁc propositions ‘Sue brought ﬂowers in’ and ‘Sue
picked ﬂowers’. In consequence they should be able to
answer, ‘I don’t know if she picked the ﬂowers or not,
I only know that she brought them in’. However, if
attention is being preferentially directed in a manic
phase at implicational meanings, then the discrepancy
should be more likely to pass unnoticed in the ﬂow of
ideation because both statement and question content
ﬁt a broad generic model. Using this measure, the au-
thors found that individuals with BD were more likely
to detect discrepant meanings in the test questions
when depressed than when manic; and conversely,
they were more likely to answer questions consistent
with a schema-based inference when manic than when
depressed. This provides support for the hypothesis
that the diﬀerent aﬀective states are associated with
diﬀerent forms of processing as described by the ICS.
The aims of the present study were to replicate this
experiment in laboratory conditions using a group of
individuals in remission from BD and a group of in-
dividuals with no history of aﬀective disorder. Until
recently it was assumed that individuals with bipolar
disorder showed few symptoms in between episodes.
However, systematic, longitudinal studies have now
shown that periods of remission are characterized by
substantial subclinical symptoms of hypomania and
depression (Judd et al. 2002, 2003; Paykel et al. 2006).
Therefore, participants in this study were not excluded
if they exhibited subclinical symptoms. Participants
were tested in the euthymic state, and then in an in-
duced positive mood. This study investigated the
hypothesis that the modes adopted when processing
meaning might diﬀer in diﬀerent aﬀective states, with
more attention being paid to schema-based (or
implicational) meaning in high mood states than in the
normal or euthymic state. We hypothesized that in
the euthymic state, there would be no diﬀerence in
responding between the BD and the control groups.
However, it is hypothesized that positive mood
induction in the bipolar group would encourage an
implicational rather than a propositional level of
774 C. L. Lomax et al.processing,whichwouldinﬂuenceperformance onthe
Question–Answertask.Wethereforeproposedthatthe
BD group would be impaired at noticing discrepancies
in schemas and would be more likely to answer ques-
tionsconsistentwithaschema-basedinferencethanthe
control group.
Method
Participants
Participants included 30 individuals with a diagnosis
of BD and 30 individuals with no history of aﬀective
disorder, comprising a non-clinical control group.
Most of those in the BD group were either referred by
a consultant psychiatrist or were recruited for this
study through advertisement. All diagnoses were
made using the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First et al. 1996). To check the
validity of the SCID diagnostic scores, an inter-rater
reliability study was carried out by comparing the
results with those collected by another investigator.
Five recorded interviews from each rater were chosen
at random and scored by the other rater on diagnosis
of bipolar 1 disorder and on depression and mania
symptoms. We found 100% agreement for the bipolar
diagnosis. The unweighted k was 0.63 [standard error
(S.E.)=0.21, 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) 0.22–1.03] for
mania symptom scores and 0.71 (S.E.=0.18, 95% CI
0.36–1.06) for depression symptom scores. Exclusion
criteria included being actively suicidal [score 3 on the
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) suicide item] and
currently fulﬁlling criteria for substance use disorders.
At least 6 months had passed since participants had
experienced an episode of mania or depression. In
terms of medication, four individuals were not taking
any medication at the time of the study, 13 were taking
only one type of medication, and 13 were taking sev-
eral medications. Of these medications, eight were
antidepressants and 32 were mood stabilizers.
For the control group, exclusion criteria included
fulﬁlling DSM-IV criteria for any lifetime psychiatric
disorder, BDI scores >16 and Mania Rating Scale
(MRS; Bech et al. 1978) scores >9. All participants
were aged between 18 and 70 years.
Measures
The MRS (Bech et al. 1978)
The MRS consists of 11 items that map into the
patient’s motor activity, visual activity, ﬂight of
thoughts, voice/noise level, hostility/destructiveness,
mood level (feeling of well-being), self-esteem, contact
(intrusiveness), sleep (average of past three nights),
sexual interest and decreased work ability. Each item
is rated on a ﬁve-point scale from 0 (not present) to
4 (severe or extreme). The scale has good inter-rater
reliability and construct validity and has accumulated
good evidence of validity (Double, 1990).
Short version of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale for
Bipolar Disorder (DAS: BD; Lam et al. 2003)
The DAS: BD consists of 24 items with high scores
corresponding to endorsement of dysfunctional atti-
tudes. This version of the DAS was developed through
principal components analysis of data from 140
individuals with remitted bipolar I disorder who
completed the Power et al. (1994) DAS-24 version.
Three subscales were generated: Achievement, Goal
attainment, and Dependent relationships with others.
This measure was selected for use within this study as
its subscales were thought to more accurately reﬂect
the dysfunctional cognitions that may become elev-
ated in BD (Lam et al. 2004). Participants indicated
their agreement with the beliefs expressed by the item
statements using a seven-point scale, ranging from
Totally agree to Totally disagree.
The BDI (Beck et al. 1961)
This is a well-known 21-item inventory designed
to measure the severity of depression in adults and
adolescents. It enquires into the somatic, cognitive and
behavioural aspects of depression in the past week,
and each item is scored on a four-point scale.
The Positive and Negative Aﬀect Scale (PANAS; Watson
et al. 1988)
The PANAS is a 20-item self-report measure of posi-
tive and negative aﬀect, reﬂecting diﬀerent disposi-
tional dimensions. In brief, positive aﬀect reﬂects the
extent to which a person is enthusiastic, active and
alert, and negative aﬀect is a dimension of subjective
distress and unpleasurable engagement that subsumes
a variety of aversive mood states, including anger,
guilt, fear and nervousness. The sum of the ratings for
10 of the adjectives provides an index of Positive
Aﬀect (PA) and the sum of the ratings for the other 10
items serve as a measure of Negative Aﬀect (NA).
Each item is rated on a scale from 1 to 5 (with re-
sponses ranging from not at all to very much). It has
been shown to have good reliability and validity
(Crawford & Henry, 2004).
The Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) of 100 mm
Momentary mood state was measured using a VAS,
measuring 10 cm, labelled ‘extremely low’ on the left
side and ‘extremely high’ on the other, with a mark at
the central point labelled ‘neutral’. Participants were
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their mood as it was at that moment. This technique of
ascertaining current mood level has been used in pre-
vious studies (e.g. Teasdale & Russell, 1983; Clark &
Teasdale, 1985).
The Question–Answer task (Palmer & Barnard, 2003)
As described previously, this task involves answering
questions about the content of simple statements to
assess the extent to which discrepant meanings are
actively being scrutinized. There were 12 ﬁller ques-
tions and 12 test questions that were randomly inter-
mixed. Both sets of questions were devised in the same
form and referenced a plausible inference based on
natural schemas for everyday events. The ﬁller state-
ments were all phrased with a main and subsidiary
clause, for example: ‘Harry thanked Anne for cooking
the lovely meal’. Filler questions mentioned only one
of the agents and always referenced the exact action
referred to in the subsidiary clause. For example:
‘Did Anne cook the meal?’ These questions are un-
ambiguously querying the agent of the action men-
tioned in the subsidiary clause and hence can always
be correctly answered with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Statements in the test set were of the same form as
ﬁllers. However, each test item allowed a pragmatic
inference to be questioned. The test questions diﬀered
from the ﬁller set in that the verb now carried a prag-
matic implication rather than the exact action men-
tioned in the statement. For example, ‘John saw Carol
drop the plate on the kitchen ﬂoor’ supports an infer-
ence that the plate probably broke. The test questions
are therefore technically ambiguous, for example ‘Did
Carol break the plate?’ should be answered ‘I don’t
know’. Such a detection of the discrepancy in meaning
between statements and questions is consistent with
use of a mode in which internal attention is pre-
ferentially focused on processing the relationships
among recently experienced adjacent ‘propositional’
meanings, which would be termed as working at the
propositional level according to the ICS analysis.
Alternatively, an answer of ‘yes’ would mean that the
discrepancies in propositional meaning, be they posi-
tive, negative or neutral, have passed unnoticed in the
ﬂow of ideation, and the individual is operating at the
implicational level according to the ICS model. Table 1
indicates the range of options for the item responses.
The questions were presented in the centre of a
computer screen for 3.5 s, followed by a 500-ms blank
screen. Participants were then asked questions about
the preceding statement and were asked to respond
with ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’ by pressing labelled
keys on the keypad. Before the test started, six practice
trials took place, and the participants were provided
with feedback. If they responded ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a
practice question based on a false presupposition, di-
rect feedback was given about why a ‘don’t know’
response should have been given. At the end of the
practice, the main block of 24 trials was presented with
no further feedback given. There were two variations
of this task (A and B) because participants carried out
the task before and after mood induction. Participants
were therefore allocated randomly to one of two
groups, which changed the order of the tasks (i.e. AB
or BA) (see Appendix).
Procedure
Participants were assessed with the SCID-IV (First
et al. 1996) and the MRS (Bech et al. 1978). They were
then asked to complete the following baseline meas-
ures: the DAS: BD (Lam et al. 2003), the BDI (Beck et al.
1961), the PANAS (Watson et al. 1988) and a VAS of
100 mm. They then carried out four experimental
tasks, one of which was the Question–Answer task
(Palmer & Barnard, 2003).
Participants were then exposed to positive mood
induction material, which consisted of three ﬁlm/
television clips lasting approximately 6 min. Presen-
tation of visual material has been used by several
groups of researchers to elicit high and low mood
change (e.g. Miranda & Persons, 1988) and has been
found to be a reliable way to elicit high mood change
(Martin, 1990). Participants were then asked to again
complete the PANAS and the VAS. To conﬁrm that the
mood induction procedure was successful in produc-
ing a positive shift in mood, the VAS mood measures
were examined. Data from three participants whose
mood had not changed were excluded from sub-
sequent analysis. Participants then undertook the
Table 1. Range of options for the item responses on the
Question–Answer task
Question
type Responses
ICS level of
operation
Filler Correct answers
Use of don’t know
Incorrect answers
Test Answers given consistent
with statement
Implicational
Correct detection of
discrepancy
Propositional
Answers given inconsistent
with statement
ICS, Interacting Cognitive Subsystems.
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pants were asked to complete a VAS again, and, where
necessary, the mood induction procedure was re-
peated as a ‘top-up’ to ensure the mood state was
maintained. This consisted of watching an additional
ﬁlm clip.
Results
Demographic and baseline measure scores of the
groups
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences were identiﬁed between the
groups in terms of age (t=1.081, p=0.077) or gender
(x=0.659, p=0.417) (Table 2). The bipolar group re-
ported signiﬁcantly higher levels of depression
(U=255.0, Z=x2.935, p=0.003) and dysfunctional
assumptions (t=2.595, df=58, p=0.012). Speciﬁcally,
they reported signiﬁcantly higher levels of dysfunc-
tional attitudes related to dependency (t=3.288,
df=58, p=0.002) and achievement (t=2.630, df=58,
p=0.011) factors, whereas no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
were identiﬁed between the groups for the goal at-
tainment and anti-dependency factors.
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
groups for the measures of momentary mood either
before or after mood induction (Table 3). However,
for both groups the mood measures indicated that
there was a signiﬁcant increase in mood following
the mood induction in the predicted direction. For
the bipolar group, change on the VAS (t=x3.640,
df=58, p=0.001) and the PANAS positive (t=13.503,
df=58, p=0.001) indicated signiﬁcant increases in
positive mood and the PANAS negative (t=12.158,
df=58, p=0.001) indicated decrease in negative
mood. These changes were also identiﬁed in the
control group, with change on the VAS (t=x4.200,
df=58, p=0.000) and the PANAS positive (t=14.290,
df=58, p=0.000) indicating signiﬁcant increase in
positive mood and the PANAS negative (t=14.534,
df=58, p=0.000) indicated signiﬁcant decrease in
negative mood.
Repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
were also carried out to determine whether the bipolar
and control groups diﬀered signiﬁcantly in the extent
to which reported mood changed following the in-
duction procedure. We found a statistically signiﬁcant
interaction between timergroup for VAS change,
which indicated that one of the groups changed more
signiﬁcantly following the mood induction procedure
(F=4.855, df=1, 58, p=0.032). Inspection of the mean
scores indicated that the VAS score of the control
group increased more than that of the bipolar group,
indicating that they showed a greater response to the
mood induction procedure.
Group diﬀerences at pre- and post-mood induction
for the Question–Answer task
Table 4 summarizes the mean scores for the groups for
the Question–Answer task measures pre- and post-
mood induction. For the test items, there were no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the groups
in the detection of the discrepancy between the state-
ment and the response, either before or after mood
induction. Pre-mood induction, the bipolar group
provided signiﬁcantly more responses that were con-
sistent with the implication (t=2.980, df=58, p=
0.004) than the control group. Although the same pat-
tern of responses was also evident following the mood
induction procedure, the statistical signiﬁcance of the
diﬀerence was reduced (t=2.160, df=58, p=0.035).
For the ﬁller items, at baseline the control group an-
swered signiﬁcantly more correctly than did the bi-
polar group (U=292.5, Z=x2.356, p=0.018). Mood
induction had no eﬀect on performance for the ﬁller
items.
Group diﬀerences for Question–Answer task
responses following mood induction with mood
measures controlled for
Repeated-measures ANOVA models were used to test
the ability of the between-subjects factor of group to
predict the within-subject factors of Question–Answer
measures pre- and post-mood induction with the in-
clusion of variables to control for mood at baseline and
change in mood. The covariates included in the
analysis were the measures of mood that the groups
signiﬁcantly diﬀered on, which were baseline de-
pression (BDI), dysfunctional attitudes (DAS) and
mood change (VAS change).
For the answers that correctly detected the discrep-
ancy, there was a signiﬁcant interaction for timerVAS
Table 2. Demographic and baseline measures for the groups
Measure Bipolar Control
Mean age in years (S.D.) 47.17 (11.67) 41.07 (14.98)
Males, n (%) 12 (40) 11 (37)
Dysfunctional Attitudes
Scale (24)
Total 86.40 (22.37) 73.40 (15.90)
Achievement 18.37 (6.86) 14.17 (5.43)
Goal attainment 20.40 (7.31) 18.63 (6.77)
Dependency 15.43 (4.83) 11.80 (3.65)
Anti-dependency 8.13 (1.77) 8.33 (1.90)
BDI total 5.30 (5.31) 1.90 (2.87)
S.D., Standard deviation; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory.
Values are mean (S.D.).
Cognitive processing in bipolar disorder 777change for the bipolar group [F(1,54)=5.191, p=0.027]
but not for the control group [F(1,54)=0.015,
p=0.902]. For answers that were consistent with the
implication, a similar relationship was found for
timerVAS change for the bipolar group [F(1,54)=
4.362, p=0.041] for the control group [F(1,54)=0.153,
p=0.697]. These ﬁndings indicate that there is a re-
lationship between mood change (VAS) and scores on
the Question–Answer task for the bipolar group but
not for the control group. For the bipolar group, an
increase in mood was robustly related to increased
ability to correctly detect the discrepancy between
statement and answer, and inversely a decreased
tendency to provide answers that were consistent with
the statement.
Conclusions
The Question–Answer task was designed to allow a
method of investigating the diﬀerent modes of
processing that are hypothesized to take place in
multi-level models of cognition. The test questions
were devised to require the propositional meaning
of sentences to be scrutinized, and also to enable
schema-based knowledge of properties associated
with everyday events to come into play. Palmer &
Barnard (2003) found that, during mania, a BD group
was less able to detect discrepancies between the
statement and question, and more likely to provide
responses that were consistent with the statement than
during depression, suggesting that they had moved to
a more implicational form of processing. In the present
study we hypothesized that positive mood induction
in a euthymic BD group would have the eﬀect of al-
tering the mode of processing to that of an impli-
cational one. However, this study did not, as
hypothesized, ﬁnd that mood induction had the eﬀect
of altering performance or that the groups diﬀered in
their ability to detect discrepancies between the state-
ments.
Nevertheless, an important aspect of Palmer &
Barnard’s study was replicated in the present study.
We found that the BD group was more likely than the
control group to answer questions that were consistent
with the implicational schema, both before and after
mood induction. This indicates that they were paying
attention to more abstract schema, or generic sche-
matic models, and were more likely to go along with
the implication, or sense, of the question. This ﬁnding
may reﬂect a general cognitive bias, that individuals
with BD in euthymia have a tendency to think in
an implicational way at a more abstract level of
Table 3. Momentary mood measure scores pre- and post-mood induction for the groups
Measure
Pre-mood induction Post-mood induction
Bipolar Control Bipolar Control
VAS 59.40 (11.25) 60.97 (14.46) 70.13 (11.59) 76.10 (13.43)
PANAS
Positive aﬀect 29.20 (6.96) 27.53 (6.10) 30.50 (8.64) 30.53 (7.50)
Negative aﬀect 11.43 (1.87) 11.33 (1.56) 10.93 (1.74) 10.50 (0.90)
VAS, Visual Analogue Scale; PANAS, Positive and Negative Aﬀect Scale.
Values are given as mean (standard deviation).
Table 4. Mean scores of Question–Answer task responses for groups pre- and post-mood induction
Question
type Responses
Pre-induction Post-induction
Bipolar Control Bipolar Control
Test Answers given consistent with statement 10.73 (7.17) 7.17 (5.00) 9.90 (3.67) 7.43 (5.06)
Correct detection of discrepancy 11.33 (5.13) 12.37 (3.48) 12.37 (3.73) 13.17 (4.17)
Answers given inconsistent with statement 1.83 (2.17) 4.46 (5.30) 1.73 (2.66) 3.40 (4.62)
Filler Correct answers 19.03 (3.71) 21.17 (1.66) 19.00 (4.25) 21.00 (1.93)
Use of don’t know 2.60 (2.85) 1.50 (1.43) 2.67 (2.59) 1.80 (1.27)
Incorrect answers 2.37 (2.34) 1.33 (1.42) 2.33 (2.86) 1.20 (1.35)
Values are given as mean (standard deviation).
778 C. L. Lomax et al.representation. A more extreme change of mood (such
as that triggered by mania) may consequently mean
that the shift in processing becomes more marked, and
that this is then characterized by a corresponding
failure to notice more marked discrepancies. Low le-
vels of mood change such as that elicited in the present
study may have been insuﬃcient to result in a move to
an implicational level of processing, and therefore was
not extreme enough to mean that participants were
unable to notice discrepancies in the tasks.
It may be hypothesized that a tendency to work
at an implicational level of processing would have
relevance to a range of everyday situations in the
euthymic state for the BD individual. The ICS account
suggests that individuals processing at a more ab-
stract, higher schematic level prefer to allow details to
be incorporated into the prevailing schema, rather
than detect and act on dissonance. Clinically, for ex-
ample, there may be evidence regarding an in-
dividual’s mood from diﬀerent sources (such as from
friends, thoughts or behaviour), and it may be that
reconciling potentially contradictory information is
more diﬃcult because of this processing bias. This
could explain why some individuals with BD have
diﬃculties in detecting and reconciling discrepant
prodromal evidence and incorporating it into their
daily lives. Potentially, a cognitive remedial training
programme aiming to teach compensatory strategies
for this deﬁcit may be helpful.
Alternative explanations are that these ﬁndings re-
ﬂect deﬁcits in executive function or in depleted cog-
nitive resources. Numerous studies have observed a
broad pattern of cognitive impairments in individuals
with BD (see Bearden et al. 2001 for review), and
such persistent cognitive deﬁcits within the BD popu-
lation at all aﬀective states may therefore provide
an alternative explanation for the results of the
present study. For example, in the present study
we found that the BD group was less accurate than
the control group at answering the ﬁller questions,
indicative of at least some problems with immediate
retention. It is hypothesized that as the ﬁller questions
did not require much processing of semantic relation-
ships, a general decrement would be consistent with a
problem in coordinating access to, and use of, execu-
tive short-term storage systems. However, it is less
clear that such an explanation would account for the
pattern of responses for the experimental items. If
deﬁcits in attention and changing sets were able to
account for diﬀerences between the groups on re-
sponses that were consistent with the schema, it
would also be expected to be identiﬁed on the groups’
abilities to correctly detect discrepancies; however, no
such diﬀerence was identiﬁed. Further tentative evi-
dence that performance on the test items is unrelated
to executive deﬁcits was indicated by the ﬁnding that
mood change was related to change in performance on
this task for the bipolar group but not for the control
group.
There are a number of conceptual and methodolo-
gical limitations to this study. The mood induction
procedure was designed to elicit aﬀective change ac-
cording to a broad deﬁnition of positive mood, such
that can be obtained in daily life following watching
television comedy. However, a more comprehensive
activation of aﬀect, which may have cognitive and
physical components, may not have been achieved
through the mood induction procedure. Furthermore,
as the changes in mood elicited in this study were
small, the likely amount of change in cognitive pro-
cessing that took place was also probably relatively
small. This limits the conclusions that can be drawn
from such ﬁndings. It may also be that the VAS, which
was used as a brief measure of mood, was capturing a
mood dimension, such as well-being. There are also
concerns regarding the use of subjective measures of
mood rating, in that it is very diﬃcult to know whe-
ther participants did in fact experience the reported
change in mood. Other issues to be taken into account
when considering the use of the procedure include
experimenter demand characteristics that may have
aﬀected self-report measures of mood. Finally, with-
out the use of a low mood induction procedure, the
impacts of mood change in implicational and prop-
ositional processing is not complete. Further research
using such a mood induction procedure is required.
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Appendix
Table A1. Version A of the Question–Answer task
Question Answer
Did the cat chase the ball? The dog watched the cat chasing the ball across the lawn
Did the nurse forget the medicine? The nurse knew that the doctor had not given any medicine to
the patient
Did Nigel buy the coat? Penny mentioned to Nigel that she had bought an expensive coat
Did Sue pick the ﬂowers? Sue gave Graham the ﬂowers which she had brought in from
the garden
Did the hunter erect the tent? The hunter photographed the game warden erecting the tent
Did Peter clean the kitchen? Jane noticed that Peter had cleaned the kitchen with the mop
Did the sergeant dig the trench? The sergeant obeyed the revolutionary’s order to dig the trench
Did the girl win the race? The girl congratulated the boy on his outstanding performance
in the race
Did the doctor bandage the leg? The doctor knew that the nurse had bandaged the child’s leg
Did George prepare the
picnic basket?
Alice reminded George that she had prepared the picnic basket
Did Christine collect the shoes? Christine told Henry that she had collected the shoes from the shop
Did Edward invent the tin openers? Edward sold Isabel one of the tin openers which he had invented
Did Diana scratch the car door? Diana annoyed David when she opened the car door onto the gatepost
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Question Answer
Did Edward paint the portrait? Isabel sold Edward one of the portraits which were stored in her studio
Did the dog steal the sausages? The cat watched the dog taking the sausages from the dish
Did Alan sell the table? Janet criticized Alan for getting rid of their antique table
Did Alan read the book? Alan criticized Janet for reading her book in bed
Did Graham build the radio? Graham gave Sue the radio which he had built
Did Donald buy the lamp? Margaret waited while Donald went into the shop to get the lamp
Did Brenda make the basket? Brenda explained to William how she had made the basket
Did Peter carry the chair? Peter noticed that Jane was struggling with the heavy chair
Did the engineer build the machine? The engineer informed the supervisor that he had completed
the work on the machine
Did Anne repair the window? Anne thanked Henry for putting the glass in the window
Did the girl pass the exam? The boy congratulated the girl for passing the exam
Did Clive park the car? Jacqueline remembered that Clive had parked the car in a side street
Did John remove the ice-cream? Carol saw John remove the ice-cream from the fridge
Did Henry injure the cyclist? Henry told Christine that he had knocked down a cyclist at the
zebra crossing
Did the hunter kill the elephant? The game warden photographed the hunter shooting at the elephant
Did the revolutionary load the gun? The revolutionary obeyed the sergeant’s order to prepare the ﬁeld
gun for action
Did the butler lock the door? The butler apologized to the maid for locking the front door
Did Nigel take the photograph? Nigel mentioned to Penny that he had brought his photograph
of the cricket match
Did Alice borrow the dictionary? George reminded Alice that he had returned the dictionary
Did Brenda burn the papers? William explained to Brenda that he had put the papers in the
incinerator
Did the engineer install the
telephone?
The supervisor informed the engineer that he had installed the
new telephone
Did Donald admire the statue? Donald waited while Margaret admired the statue in the museum
Did the secretary send the telegram? The manager sent the secretary a telegram on her birthday
Did the man win the prize? The woman showed the man the prize she had won
Did George hide the pen George forgave Claire for putting his pen underneath the tablecloth
Did the detective ﬁnd the jewellery? The detective praised the constable for ﬁnding the stolen jewellery
Did Diana move the furniture? David annoyed Diana when he moved the furniture in the study
Did Anne cook the meal? Henry thanked Anne for cooking the delightful meal
Did the manager write the report? The secretary sent the manager a report on the meeting she had attended
Did Claire lose the clock? Claire forgave George for losing her new clock
Did Jacqueline inherit the car? Clive remembered that Jacqueline had acquired the car from her uncle
Did the woman rescue the child? The man showed the woman how he had pulled the child from
the water
Did the constable arrest the
criminal?
The constable praised the detective for stopping the criminal from
robbing the bank
Did the butler drop the vase? The maid apologized to the butler for breaking the Chinese vase
Did Carol break the plate? John saw Carol drop the dinner plate on the ﬂoor
Did the cat chase the ball? The dog watched the cat chasing the ball across the lawn
Did the nurse forget the medicine? The nurse knew that the doctor had not given any medicine
to the patient
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Question Answer
Did Carol remove the ice-cream? Carol saw John remove the ice-cream from the fridge
Did Margaret admire the statue? Donald waited while Margaret admired the statue in the museum
Did David scratch the car door? Diana annoyed David when she opened the car door onto the gatepost
Did the constable ﬁnd the jewellery? The detective praised the constable for ﬁnding the stolen jewellery
Did Penny buy the coat? Penny mentioned to Nigel that she had bought an expensive coat
Did the detective arrest the
criminal?
The constable praised the detective for stopping the criminal from
robbing the bank
Did Janet sell the table? Janet criticized Alan for getting rid of their antique table
Did the game warden erect
the tent?
The hunter photographed the game warden erecting the tent
Did William burn the papers? William explained to Brenda that he had put the papers in
the incinerator
Did the doctor forget the
medicine?
The nurse knew that the doctor had not given any medicine to
the patient
Did Henry cook the meal? Henry thanked Anne for cooking the delightful meal
Did Jane carry the chair? Peter noticed that Jane was struggling with the heavy chair
Did the supervisor build
the machine?
The engineer informed the supervisor that he had completed the
work on the machine
Did Henry collect the shoes? Christine told Henry that she had collected the shoes from the shop
Did Jane clean the kitchen? Jane noticed that Peter had cleaned the kitchen with the mop
Was the radio built by Sue? Graham gave Sue the radio which he had built
Did George lose the clock? Claire forgave George for losing her new clock
Did Margaret buy the lamp? Margaret waited while Donald went into the shop to get the lamp
Did the maid lock the door? The butler apologized to the maid for locking the front door
Did Henry repair the window? Anne thanked Henry for putting the glass in the window
Did the man rescue the child? The man showed the woman how he had pulled the child from
the water
Did Alice prepare the
picnic basket?
Alice reminded George that she had prepared the picnic basket
Did the supervisor install
the phone?
The supervisor informed the engineer that he had installed the
new telephone
Did the game warden kill
the elephant?
The game warden photographed the hunter shooting at the elephant
Did Isabel invent the tin opener? Edward sold Isabel one of the tin openers which he had invented
Did the woman win the prize? The woman showed the man the prize she had won
Did the secretary write the report? The secretary sent the manager a report on the meeting she had attended
Did Claire hide the pen? George forgave Claire for putting his pen underneath the tablecloth
Did the sergeant load the gun? The revolutionary obeyed the sergeant’s order to prepare the
ﬁeld gun for action
Did Janet read the book Alan criticized Janet for reading her book in bed
Did the nurse bandage the leg? The doctor knew that the nurse had bandaged the child’s leg
Did George borrow the dictionary? George reminded Alice that he had returned the dictionary
Did the dog chase the ball? The dog watched the cat chasing the ball across the lawn
Did David move the furniture? David annoyed Diana when he moved the furniture in the study
Did William make the basket? Brenda explained to William how she had made the basket
Did Isabel paint the portrait? Isabel sold Edward one of the portraits which were stored in her studio
Did Jacqueline park the car? Jacqueline remembered that Clive had parked the car in a side street
Did Clive inherit the car? Clive remembered that Jacqueline had acquired the car from her uncle
Did the boy win the race? The girl congratulated the boy on his outstanding performance
in the race
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Question Answer
Did Christine injure the cyclist? Henry told Christine that he had knocked down a cyclist at the
zebra crossing
Did the revolutionary dig the trench? The sergeant obeyed the revolutionary’s order to dig the trench
Did Graham pick the ﬂowers? Sue gave Graham the ﬂowers which she had brought in from the garden
Did the boy pass the exam? The boy congratulated the girl for passing the exam
Did the maid drop the vase? The maid apologized to the butler for breaking the Chinese vase
Did the manager send the telegram? The manager sent the secretary a telegram on her birthday
Did Penny take the photograph? Nigel mentioned to Penny that he had brought his photograph of
the cricket match
Did the cat steal the sausages? The cat watched the dog taking the sausages from the dish
Did John break the plate? John saw Carol drop the dinner plate on the ﬂoor
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